

#### Before the

### FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

Washington, D.C. 20554

In the Matter of: :CC Docket Petition of WorldCom, Inc., Pursuant : No. 00-218to Section 252(e)(5) of the Communications Act for Expedited Preemption of the Jurisdiction of the Virginia State Corporation Commission Regarding Interconnection Disputes with Verizon Virginia, Inc., and for Expedited Arbitration In the Matter of: :CC Docket Petition of Cox Virginia Telecom, Inc., :No. 00-249Pursuant to Section 252(e)(5) of the Communications Act for Preemption of the Jurisdiction of the Virginia State Corporation Commission Regarding Interconnection Disputes with Verizon Virginia, Inc., and for Arbitration In the Matter of: :CC Docket Petition of AT&T Communications of : No. 00-251Virginia, Inc., Pursuant to Section 252(e)(5) of the Communications Act for Preemption of the Jurisdiction of the Virginia Corporation Commission Regarding Interconnection Disputes with Verizon Virginia, Inc. x Volume

Thursday, October 11, 2001 Washington, D.C.

The hearing in the above-entitled matter came on, pursuant to Notice, at 9:30 a.m.

### BEFORE:

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KATHERINE FARROBA, Staff

JEFFREY DYGERT, Staff

JOHN STANLEY, Staff

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# C O N T E N T S

PANEL	PAGE
INTERCARRIER COMPENSATION PANEL:	
MARK ARGENBRIGHT GARY BALL DR. FRANCIS COLLINS ROBERT KIRCHBERGER JOHN D. SCHELL DAVID L. TALBOTT	
Cross-examination by Mr. Oates	1651
STEVEN J. PITTERLE	
Cross-examination by Mr. McRae	1733
Cross-examination by Mr. Harrington	1744
Cross-examination by Ms. Kelley	1794
Cross-examination by Mr. Harrington	1803
Cross-examination by Ms. Schmidt	1826
Questions from Staff	1830
SUBPANEL 1: CHRIS ANTONIOU  PAMELA RICHARDSON  RON ZIMMERMAN	
Questions from Staff	1924

# EXHIBITS

NUMBER	MARKED	ADMITTED
WorldCom Nos. 48, 49		1647
Verizon Nos. 52, 53		1647
Cox Nos. 20, 21	1803	1827
Verizon No. 54		1827
Verizon No. 37	1906	
Verizon No. 55	1914	1916

# RECORD REQUESTS

NUMBER	PAGE
1.	1774

#### PROCEEDINGS

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MR. DYGERT: I think if people are ready, we could get started.

First, we wanted to get back to the parties on the cost scheduling issues that were the subject of some e-mails earlier in the week.

MS. PREISS: Okay, sorry. I'm referring to the e-mail from Katherine Ronis, dated
October 9th. We just wanted to let you know that we are fine with the schedule for the cost part of the hearings proposed by the parties, and we are also fine with the briefing schedule proposed by the parties. So, the initial brief would be due November 15th. The reply brief would be December 3rd.

And on the cost schedule, I do understand we might be hearing back from the parties as to whether the switching rate design panel, which is West, Goldfarb, and Kirchberger, might be handled at the same time or just after the switching rate panel on October 24th. But subject to that adjustment, that possible adjustment, we are fine

 $1 \parallel$  with the schedule proposed by the parties.

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MR. DYGERT: And also if you all have thoughts about when we could pick back up next week, I thought we might talk about that briefly at this point.

MR. EDWARDS: Since it was at our request, I think we will accommodate what we can, so why don't we hear from petitioners.

MS. KELLEY: I know that our--one of our witnesses is unavailable Tuesday and Wednesday. Hе will be at a hearing in Florida. And then--but Thursday and Friday are generally okay. Monday was a problem for Verizon, so we didn't sort of check on that. Thursday and Friday are the days we are looking at to start on Thursday because somebody has got to get out on Friday at the end of the day.

MR. DYGERT: All right. Friday is not ideal for the FCC.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR. DYGERT: Does anyone else have any 22 preliminary matters that we need to deal with? I'm

1	guessing no, then.
2	MS. SCHMIDT: Just AT&T passed out thea
3	copy of AT&T Exhibit 36, which is the network
4	diagram that was drawn by Mr. Talbott yesterday
5	afternoon, but we would like to have that moved
6	into evidence.
7	MR. DYGERT: All right. And we also have
8	WorldCom Exhibits 48 and 49 that were drawn
9	yesterday, as well as Verizon Exhibits 52 and 53.
10	Are there any objections from any of the
11	parties to any of these exhibits?
12	MS. KELLEY: None from WorldCom.
13	MR. EDWARDS: None from Verizon.
14	MR. HARRINGTON: Not from Cox.
15	MS. SCHMIDT: Not from AT&T.
16	MR. DYGERT: Okay. Then these will be
17	admitted into the record.
18	(WorldCom Exhibit Nos. 48
19	and 49, and Verizon Exhibit
20	Nos. 52 and 53, were
21	admitted into evidence.)
22	MR. DYGERT: So, it means we are now back

1 to the intercarrier compensation panel, I believe,

2 with--all of which remains is issues I-5--correct

3 me if I'm wrong on this--I-5, I-6, and IV-35

4 because the others were either handled earlier

5∥already or are being treated with--in connection

6 with another issue on one of the network

7 architecture panels, subpanel five.

MS. KELLEY: That's my understanding.

MR. OATES: That's ours as well.

MS. DAILEY: Can I get a clarification on

11 an issue.

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12 IV-35 is listed twice on intercarrier

13 compensation subpanel -- I don't see the subpanel,

14 but the panel that's here, but it's also listed

15 under pricing terms and conditions on subpanel two.

16 Is there going to be testimony on both of those

17 panels on this issue?

18 MS. KELLEY: Not from us, our witnesses,

19 although our witness will be here, so we could put

20||him up twice, but we anticipated just having him on

21 this panel.

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I'm trying to recall what happened. It

had to do with something with the Verizon witness

put their testimony in with their pricing terms and

conditions panel, I believe, and we didn't

structure our testimony that way, but we had always

thought of it as an intercarrier compensation

issue, and I think that's why I thought there was

this sort of odd divide, if I remember correctly.

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MR. OATES: Yeah, I don't know the history of it, and that may well be right. We have a witness here who is prepared to address that issue. I can't say that there may not be some related comments or carryover on the pricing terms and conditions panel as well. I'm simply not familiar with what that panel is going to cover. But we are prepared to cover that issue today.

MS. DAILEY: Well, is there a different witness on subpanel two than there is on the intercarrier compensation panel?

MR. OATES: On the pricing terms and conditions panel?

MS. DAILEY: Yeah.

MR. OATES: We will check on that.

1 MR. DYGERT: All right. I gather from the presence of the petitioner's witnesses at the witness table, that I guess it's Verizon's turn to Gentlemen, would you first please identify cross. yourselves for the record. And since you all look like familiar faces, I think you are all still under oath.

MR. ARGENBRIGHT: Mark Argenbright, WorldCom.

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MR. BALL: Gary Ball, WorldCom.

11 DR. COLLINS: Francis Collins, appearing on behalf of Cox. 12

MR. KIRCHBERGER: Bob Kirchberger, AT&T.

MR. SCHELL: John Schell, AT&T.

MR. TALBOTT: David L. Talbott, AT&T.

MR. DYGERT: Thank you.

MR. OATES: If I could answer a question 18 posed earlier, it doesn't appear that we have a witness or that we expect to have testimony on 435 20 on the pricing terms and conditions panel. It will just be the witness we have here today.

MR. DYGERT: Okay, Mr. Oates, whenever

you're ready. 1

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### CROSS-EXAMINATION

MR. OATES: Good morning, gentlemen. If I could first direct my questions to the AT&T witness, Mr. Kirchberger, and these questions relate to issue "Eye" five, or I-5, rather.

Mr. Kirchberger, what I'm going to be referring to in asking you some questions is the 9 proposed -- AT&T proposed contract language that was appended to your direct testimony and labeled as "Exhibit A" to that testimony. The testimony 12 itself is AT&T Exhibit 4, I believe.

Is that still the current and correct 14 contract language?

MR. KIRCHBERGER: To the best of my 16 knowledge, it is.

MR. OATES: I want to make sure there's 18 nothing different on the JDPL.

Mr. Kirchberger, is it AT&T's position 20 that that language offered in Exhibit A to your 21 direct testimony merely implements but does not 22 | alter in any fashion the requirements of the FCC's

ISP Remand Order? And when I referred to that

order, or when I say "ISP Remand Order," I'm

talking about the order released on April 27 from

the Commission, addressing reciprocal compensation

for ISP contracts.

MR. KIRCHBERGER: I think the majority of it is just detailed implementation guidelines.

There is some language in there that is not in the order, and that is that Verizon has paid off past-due amounts for ISP traffic prior to June 14th, 2001.

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So, I do not believe that you will find that in the Remand Order, but it is in this. But otherwise, the issues surrounding calculation of the caps and the billing suggestions are detailed implementation procedures that our experts have worked out.

MR. OATES: And is it your position that those detailed implementation procedures that you described are, other than the historical billing dispute, that those procedures are not in conflict with the ISP Remand Order in any fashion?

MR. KIRCHBERGER: That is my

2∥understanding.

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MR. OATES: Okay. I would like to ask you about a few of those, Mr. Kirchberger.

First, in Section 2.1 of the AT&T proposed language, AT&T purports to define the term "local traffic"; is that not right?

MR. KIRCHBERGER: Yes.

MR. OATES: And are you aware that the FCC, in its ISP Remand Order, expressly avoided reliance on a definition of local traffic in determining what was eligible for ISP recip comp?

MR. KIRCHBERGER: That is my

understanding; that is correct.

MR. OATES: Now, under the AT&T definition of "local traffic," that traffic is intended, is it not, to encompass essentially all nontoll traffic, other than ISP-bound traffic?

MR. KIRCHBERGER: I believe that would be 20 a fair definition.

MR. OATES: I guess what I'm getting at,
Mr. Kirchberger, is that traffic is subject to

either interstate or intrastate access toll, AT&T would exclude from its definition of "local traffic," would it not?

MR. KIRCHBERGER: Toll traffic that qualifies for access payments would be excluded from the local traffic definition.

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MR. OATES: And that toll traffic that is excluded from local traffic is also excluded from the calculation that's performed in doing the three-to-one ratio that derives the threshold of traffic that is eliqible for ISP-bound recip comp; is that correct?

MR. KIRCHBERGER: I believe that's my 14 understanding.

MR. OATES: And that sort of toll traffic that is excluded would include either intrastate or interstate exchange access traffic; is that right?

> MR. KIRCHBERGER: It's my understanding.

MR. OATES: And it would exclude information access traffic; is that right?

MR. KIRCHBERGER: Can you give me a better definition of what you mean by "information access

1 traffic."

5 Remand Order?

MR. OATES: Well, would it exclude 3 information access traffic, as that term is defined 4 | by--the Commission defined or discussed in the

MR. KIRCHBERGER: Without actually looking 7 | for that definition in the ISP Remand Order, I 8 cannot answer that question.

MR. OATES: Are you familiar enough with 10 the order, Mr. Kirchberger, to know that the 11 Commission found that information access traffic is 12 | traffic that is subject to 251(q) of the Act and, 13 therefore, not subject to 251(b)(5) recip comp? MR. KIRCHBERGER: I will take that subject

MR. OATES: Subject to confirmation, 17 that's your understanding?

15 to check. I will accept that.

MR. KIRCHBERGER: Well, subject to 19 actually reading that part of the Remand Order.

20 MR. OATES: I won't make you do that,

21 Mr. Kirchberger.

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Assuming, though, that my reading of

paragraph 34 of the ISP Remand Order is correct,
then, and that information access traffic was found
by the Commission to be subject to 251(g) and
excluded from reciprocal compensation, information
access traffic would then be a form of traffic that
AT&T would exclude from its definition of local
traffic and from the three-to-one calculation; is
that right?

MR. KIRCHBERGER: I will accept that.

MR. OATES: And would AT&T agree, rather, that optional extended local calling area traffic would be excluded from the definition--or from the traffic, rather, that's included in the three-to-one analysis?

MR. KIRCHBERGER: Yes.

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MR. OATES: And would that three-to-one analysis also exclude tandem transit traffic?

MR. KIRCHBERGER: I don't know. You are at a level of detail of the calculation that I actually can't answer, sorry.

MR. OATES: Let me refer you back to the 22 AT&T contract language itself, and specifically

1 paragraph or Section 2.1, once again.

2 MR. KIRCHBERGER:

MR. OATES: And specifically the last sentence in that particular section. And let me 5| just read it, and--do you have that language in 6 front of you, Mr. Kirchberger?

MR. KIRCHBERGER: Is this from my Exhibit A on my attachment?

MR. OATES: Yes, yes, it is.

The last sentence reads, (reading) All 11 other local traffic that is exchanged between the 12 parties -- and you understand "other local traffic" 13 excludes -- excuse me just a second.

Okay. Would you do me a favor, Mr. Kirchberger, read that Section 2.1 just to 16 yourself so you are familiar with it.

(Pause.)

Yes, I have read it. MR. KIRCHBERGER:

MR. OATES: And the second sentence,

20 essentially, reflects the three-to-one rule, does

21 it not?

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MR. KIRCHBERGER: Yes.

MR. OATES: And the second sentence then 2 say, (reading) All other local traffic is conclusively defined to be voice traffic.

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4 MR. KIRCHBERGER: Yes, that's what the 5 words say.

MR. OATES: And that traffic, under AT&T's proposal, would be subject to reciprocal compensation; is that right?

MR. KIRCHBERGER: Yes, it would.

MR. OATES: Now, in the ISP Remand Order, 11 Mr. Kirchberger, does the three-to-one rule not 12 create a rebuttable presumption?

MR. KIRCHBERGER: Yeah, yeah, I believe it 14 does. It does create a rebuttable presumption.

MR. OATES: All right. And in fact, the 16 | Commission, at paragraph 79 of the ISP Remand 17∥Order, goes on to state or to explain that a party 18 | has an opportunity to rebut that three-to-one 19 presumption, discusses generally how a party may do so; is that right?

> MR. KIRCHBERGER: That is correct.

MR. OATES: Under the AT&T proposal, does

a party have any opportunity to rebut the three-to-one presumption?

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MR. KIRCHBERGER: Narrow reading of it would say that the word "conclusively" questions the rebuttable presumption.

MR. OATES: It suggests that the presumption is irrebuttable, doesn't it?

MR. KIRCHBERGER: It certainly leans that way. You know, I can't give you a legal answer on that, but you could read it that way, yes, sir.

MR. OATES: All right. Let me ask you to look at Section 2.2.3 of your proposed language, and this particular section sets forth three prerequisites that AT&T proposes to implementing the Commission ordered compensation scheme for ISP-bound traffic; isn't that right?

MR. KIRCHBERGER: That's correct.

MR. OATES: Do those prerequisites appear anywhere in the Commission's ISP Remand Order?

MR. KIRCHBERGER: No, I indicated in my earlier answer that one of these three was one of the examples I gave that indicated that there were

some things in our contract language that were not in the Remand Order.

MR. OATES: Earlier, you alluded to payment of past-due amounts for ISP reciprocal compensation, and that's --

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MR. KIRCHBERGER: 6 That's correct. That's 7 | C.

MR. OATES: That's number C--letter C, 9 rather, the prerequisite.

If you would, Mr. Kirchberger, read 11 prerequisite A and B.

(Reading) The rates MR. KIRCHBERGER: 13 described in Section 2.2.2 shall apply only if, A, 14 | Verizon requests that the ISP-bound traffic be 15 treated at the rate specified in the ISP Remand 16 | Order; B, Verizon offers to exchange all traffic 17∥subject to the reciprocal compensation provisions 18∥of Section 251(b)(5) with LECs, CLECs, and CMRS providers at these rates; and C, Verizon has paid 20 all past-due amounts owed to AT&T--

21 MR. OATES: You could stop there,

22∥Mr. Kirchberger. I was actually going to ask you

1 to read it to yourself, but it's A and B I would like to ask you about. You already addressed C.

Can you explain what the difference between A and B is.

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MR. KIRCHBERGER: It's my understanding 6 | that B is the mirroring language, and A is requests 7 that Verizon actually requests the ISP-bound traffic be treated. My understanding is there was a letter of May 14th that Verizon had sent to the CLECs, or at least to AT&T that I believe addresses Α.

MR. OATES: Okay. So, it's your understanding that Verizon has satisfied prerequisite A?

MR. KIRCHBERGER: I can't give you a legal answer whether it satisfied a prerequisite, but it 17 | is my understanding that that letter is on record that you sent out on May 14th -- a reasonable man might say that it satisfied. Legally, I can't give 20 you that answer.

21 MR. OATES: And do you know,

22 Mr. Kirchberger, whether that prerequisite outlined

1 | in A there, 2.2.2.3.A, is something that appears in 2 the ISP Remand Order?

MR. KIRCHBERGER: I actually don't know the answer.

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MR. OATES: You referred to in describing B to the mirroring language. And are you referring 7 to something that is in the ISP Remand Order, which  $\mid$ is the obligation that the Commission places on ILECs to offer or exchange traffic subject to 251(b)(5) at the same rates that are proposed for 11 ISP-bound traffic? Is that what you mean by the 12 mirroring?

MR. KIRCHBERGER: Yeah, that's my 14 understanding.

MR. OATES: In your--and let me read you 16 from paragraph 89 of the ISP recip comp order, and 17∥if you have that in front of you, it's on page 44 18 about three lines down. The sentence reads, 19∥(reading) The rate caps for ISP-bound traffic that 20 | we adopt here today, therefore--apply therefore 21 only if an incumbent elects to exchange all traffic  $22 \parallel \text{subject to Section } 251(b)(5)$  at the same rate.

That's the mirroring obligation?

MR. KIRCHBERGER: Yes.

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MR. OATES: I'm sorry? Is that a yes?

MR. KIRCHBERGER: That's a yes.

MR. OATES: Now, the language that AT&T proposes in 2.2.3.B expands upon that Commission language, Mr. Kirchberger, by saying that Verizon should offer to exchange such traffic with LECs, CLECs, and CMRS providers.

Is that intended by AT&T to be an expansion on the obligation that the Commission imposes in paragraph 89?

MR. KIRCHBERGER: I'm not aware that it I didn't draft this contract language, so I -- if there was an intention beyond by knowledge, I 16 can't speak for that.

MR. OATES: Would it be your understanding 18 of the mirroring obligation imposed by the 19 Commission that Verizon would satisfy that on a 20 CLEC-by-CLEC basis if we limit the inquiry to 21 CLECs? In other words, what I'm asking, Mr. Kirchberger, if Verizon offers to exchange

traffic subject to Section 251(b)(5) with AT&T at
the same rates as are listed by the Commission for
ISP-bound traffic, you would agree that Verizon has
satisfied the mirroring obligation as far as AT&T
goes?

MR. KIRCHBERGER: I'm aware that you have offered to AT&T to satisfy the mirroring obligations.

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I'm also aware of the fact that AT&T has not responded to that letter. I cannot give you a direct reason why, so I think our response to that letter would probably indicate whether we accept that as meeting the mirroring obligations or not.

MR. OATES: Let me--what I'm really getting at, Mr. Kirchberger, in my question is, you don't suggest that Verizon has an obligation, for instance, to offer to exchange 251(b)(5) traffic at the same rate as ISP recip comp traffic with WorldCom before it can do so--or with any other CLEC before it could do so with AT&T? In other words, the obligation is satisfied on a CLEC-by-CLEC basis?

1 MR. KIRCHBERGER: I would accept that. think the key is obligation C. If Verizon sat down with us and paid us what it owes us for past-due amounts, maybe some of this language could get 5 cleaned up and people could move forward.

MR. OATES: And that past-due amount alluded to in C is a point of dispute between Verizon and AT&T, is it not?

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MR. KIRCHBERGER: Yes, throughout the 10 entire Verizon region. It's my understanding that the amount is in excess of 10 to \$20 million.

MR. OATES: And that's AT&T's position on the dispute?

MR. KIRCHBERGER: Yes, that is AT&T's 15 position on the dispute, I believe.

16 MR. OATES: Is that a dispute, Mr. Kirchberger, that arises under a prior Interconnection Agreement? Is that right? 18

MR. KIRCHBERGER: It arises under the Interconnection Agreement between AT&T and Verizon, 21 so yeah--so, would be the one that we are trying to 22∥hammer out here again today.

1 MR. OATES: If there is an obligation to 2 repay that recip comp, the agreements to which we are here arbitrating a successor; is that right? 4 Yes, that's correct, and MR. KIRCHBERGER: 5 it's not unreasonable that if you had past 6 compliance problems or disputes, that you would 7∥want to try to have those cleaned up or nailed down going forward so they don't happen again. 9 MR. OATES: And the old agreement, in 10 fact, has dispute resolution procedures, does it 11 not, Mr. Kirchberger? 12 MR. KIRCHBERGER: Yes, it does. MR. OATES: 13 All right. In Section 2.3 of your proposed language -- this is the language that 15 discusses the growth caps; is that right? 16 MR. KIRCHBERGER: Yes, it does. 17 MR. OATES: And the growth caps are something specifically covered by the Commission's 18 19 order; right? 20 MR. KIRCHBERGER: Yes. 21 MR. OATES: I'm referring to the ISP 22 Remand Order.

And both the Commission's order and AT&T rely on a -- in order to determine the cap for ISP-bound reciprocal compensation for the year 2001, the Commission and AT&T both rely on a calculation that's based on minutes for the first quarter of 2001; is that right?

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MR. KIRCHBERGER: That's correct.

MR. OATES: Does AT&T propose the same formula there that the Commission does? 10 know.

MR. KIRCHBERGER: I don't know. I have not researched, but the details of the growth cap formula, the specification of the billing and the rates are AT&T's experts', detailed experts', interpretation of and actually just a detailed implementation guidelines of the Remand Order.

And what we are trying to do here is to hammer out in detail and put into the contract language what is referred to in more general terms in the order, so that there would be less disputes in the future as to the interpretation and the application of the order.

So--

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MR. OATES: And I don't intend my question to be a memory test for you, Mr. Kirchberger. It's not my intent. I want to ask you about some points that appear to flag or are inconsistent with the Commission's order. Let's talk about the growth cap point for a minute.

If you would turn to paragraph 78 of the ISP Remand Order.

MR. KIRCHBERGER: I'm there.

MR. OATES: About halfway through that paragraph, there is the sentence that begins, "For the year 2001," and defines the formula for the cap for that particular calendar year.

Do you see that sentence?

MR. KIRCHBERGER: Yes.

MR. OATES: Okay. Towards the end of that sentence the Commission uses the phrase--well, let me read the entire sentence so it's in context in the record.

(Reading) For the year 2001, a LEC may receive compensation pursuant to a particular

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growth factor.

1 Interconnection Agreement for ISP-bound minutes up 2 to a ceiling equal to, on an annualized basis, the number of ISP-bound minutes for which that LEC was entitled to compensation under that agreement during the first quarter of 2001, plus a 10 percent

Now, would you agree, Mr. Kirchberger, that whatever compensation--whatever compensation 9 AT&T may be due from Verizon for ISP-bound traffic 10 would be determined by the old Interconnection Agreement, again the one to which we are arbitrating a successor here today?

MR. KIRCHBERGER: I was reading. Could you repeat that?

> Yes, sir, I'm sorry. MR. OATES:

Whatever compensation AT&T is due for ISP-bound traffic would be determined by the old Interconnection Agreement between Verizon and AT&T; is that right?

MR. KIRCHBERGER: Prior to the effectiveness of this new agreement, yes.

MR. OATES: Yes, sir.

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And the amount of minutes for which AT&T is entitled to compensation for that period of time is, as you discussed a minute ago, a point of dispute between the parties, is it not?

MR. KIRCHBERGER: That's correct.

MR. OATES: All right. Now, AT&T's language on this point, if you would, please look at that--again, that's paragraph 2.3--and specifically the second sentence, (reading) The parties shall first determine the total number of minutes of use of ISP-bound traffic as defined in Section 2.1 above, terminated by one party for the other party for the three-month period commencing January 1, 2001, and ending March 21, 2001.

AT&T includes no qualifier in that language regarding minutes to which it was entitled to compensation, does it?

MR. KIRCHBERGER: No, it doesn't.

MR. OATES: Al right. Now,

Mr. Kirchberger, if you look at Section 2.5, which is the last section in the AT&T proposed language, that's a change-of-law provision, is it not?

MR. KIRCHBERGER: Yes, it is.

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MR. OATES: And are you aware that there is a change-in-law provision that has been negotiated elsewhere in the contract? And I don't mean to represent that that language has been agreed to because, quite frankly, I don't know if it has or not, but there is a general change-of-law provision in the contract?

MR. KIRCHBERGER: I would agree that there probably is. I'm not sure whether we agreed to language on that or not.

MR. OATES: All right. But is it your understanding that 2.5 in the -- in your Exhibit A is a change-in-law provision that is unique to the ISP 15 reciprocal compensation issue?

MR. KIRCHBERGER: Yes, that's the way I read it.

MR. OATES: It would be AT&T's position that the general change-in-law provision is every insufficient to address whatever change in law may occur in the future for ISP-bound traffic?

> I believe the purpose of MR. KIRCHBERGER:

1 this paragraph was to tighten up and to indicate 2 exactly how ISP-bound traffic would be handled if, in fact, the Remand Order was modified, overturned, stayed, reversed. And to lay out a detailed approach up front rather than, I quess, debating about it and taking it to dispute resolution of interpretation of change in law at the time.

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But what we have done here, as in many places, we have tried to have more detail in the Interconnection Agreement rather than less because less detail just sets you up for implementation problems in disputes as you go forward.

But as I understand what you MR. OATES: said, Mr. Kirchberger, it's AT&T's position that you want unique change-in-law provisions regarding ISP-bound traffic, compensation for ISP-bound traffic, in the event the law changes so you could reap immediate benefit from what that change might be, as opposed to relying on the general change-in-law provision; is that right?

MR. KIRCHBERGER: I would quibble with the words of "reap immediate benefit." I would say

1 that we are looking for a unique change--unique 2 detail if the Remand Order is stayed, reversed, or  $3 \parallel modified$ , so that the appropriate benefit is available to the parties, whoever benefits from the change.

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MR. OATES: That's not what the law--that's not what the language predicts, is it, 8 Mr. Kirchberger? In fact, the language purports to 9 predict what the change in law might be.

If you would look, please, at the last sentence or two, beginning "At such time as the ISP Remand Order is stayed, " it discusses amounts immediately due and payable, and the immediate exchange of traffic in a specific fashion.

MR. KIRCHBERGER: The language is what it I mean, to try to characterize it as one way or another, I can't realistically respond to that.

MR. OATES: Now, I understand you're not a lawyer, Mr. Kirchberger, but to your knowledge is it possible that there could be a change in law regarding compensation for ISP-bound traffic that 22∥would be inconsistent with the language proposed by ΑΤ&Τ?

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MR. KIRCHBERGER: There is always that 3 possibility.

MR. OATES: The AT&T language, again in that last sentence, would provide for the 6 retroactive application of any future change of law, would it not?

MR. KIRCHBERGER: Yes, it would.

MR. OATES: All right. Mr. Kirchberger, 10 | now shifting gears, in your testimony you offered 11||some comments about some of Verizon's testimony or 12 proposal -- proposals with regard to this issue.

Let me ask you to look at page four of 14 your rebuttal testimony. Just a second, and I will give you an exhibit number. Exhibit 9, I believe. 16 AT&T 9.

MR. KIRCHBERGER: I think I'm there.

MR. OATES: This is line seven of your testimony, which is the beginning of an answer, (reading) Can you provide some other examples of 21 where Verizon's proposed implementation language 22 was too general?

MR. KIRCHBERGER: Yes.

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MR. OATES: And the first issue that you raise there is Verizon failed to include specific rate levels as AT&T did in part of its proposals.

Aren't those rates and effective dates for the rates spelled out in the ISP Remand Order, Mr. Kirchberger?

MR. KIRCHBERGER: Yes, they are, but the differences in our language, I think we tried to 10∥make it specific to the time frames associated with the potential contract itself.

MR. OATES: Doesn't the ISP order set the 13∥time frames to the rates that are applicable?

MR. KIRCHBERGER: The ISP Order definitely 15∥sets the time frames, and what we have done is taken them and put them in the contract language and given more specificity to it, making it a more complete package.

19 MS. PREISS: Could I interrupt for a 20 minute, please?

Mr. Kirchberger, is it your understanding that the figures set out in the ISP Order, ISP

Remand Order, are rates are for the exchange of traffic or rate caps for the exchange of traffic?

MR. KIRCHBERGER: I believe they are rate 4 caps.

MS. PREISS: And what AT&T has proposed in its language is actual rates or rate caps?

MR. KIRCHBERGER: Rates.

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MS. PREISS: Thank you.

MR. OATES: In that testimony in the same area, the second paragraph of that answer,
Mr. Kirchberger, on page four of your rebuttal,
beginning on line 13--actually line 15, you state

that Verizon has failed to specify means of calculating the growth cap, and again the question is the same: Isn't that spelled out in the Commission's order?

MR. KIRCHBERGER: Yes, it is.

MR. OATES: Mr. Kirchberger, thank you.

19 That's all I have for you. Now, if I could move to 20 Mr. Ball.

Mr. Ball, good morning.

MR. BALL: Good morning.

MR. OATES: Again, Mr. Ball, as I have

just done with Mr. Kirchberger, I would like to

walk through some specific issues in the language

that WorldCom has proposed on this ISP-bound recip

comp question. The language that I'm looking at is

quoted in your direct testimony, which is

Exhibit 3, and that language set out at the

beginning of page 43.

And my first question is a housekeeping one. Should I be looking at anything else, or is that an accurate version of the proposal? It appears to be the same as what's in the JDPL.

MR. BALL: Yes.

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MR. OATES: If there is any inconsistency, base on what I'm asking you, please let me know that there is not a revised version or later proposal that I'm missing.

Okay, like WorldCom, Mr. Ball, on your section X.3, you propose three prerequisites to the implementation of the Commission-ordered ISP-bound compensation scheme; is that right?

MR. BALL: Yes.

MR. OATES: And do you agree with the testimony of Mr. Kirchberger that the prerequisite in C regarding payment of disputed past-due amounts is not something that appears anywhere in the Commission's order?

MR. BALL: Yes.

MR. OATES: Let me ask your opinion,

Mr. Ball, as to what the difference is between

prerequisite A and prerequisite B.

MR. BALL: Well, prerequisite A basically describes the obligation that Verizon has to initiate the implementation of the rates in the FCC order, and Section B basically describes the mirroring provision.

MR. OATES: And do you agree with Mr. Kirchberger that AT&T--that Verizon has satisfied the obligation in A by virtue of the letter dated May 14? Are you familiar with that letter?

MR. BALL: I'm familiar with the letters that Verizon has sent to the CLECs, so yes.

MR. OATES: Do you agree that letter of

May 14 satisfies whatever obligation A imposes?

MR. BALL: Yes.

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MR. OATES: And regarding the proposal or the prerequisite, rather, in B, again, I will ask you the same question I asked Mr. Kirchberger.

Is it your understanding that Verizon can satisfy that mirroring obligation on a CLEC-by-CLEC basis?

> MR. BALL: No.

MS. KELLEY: Could I ask a clarifying question here? My particular question is when you ask that, are you asking whether they satisfy it under our proposed language or whether they satisfy it pursuant to the Commission's orders?

I'm asking under your proposed MR. OATES: language. Your proposed language, as does AT&T's, expands upon the Commission's mirroring language to 18 the extent that it speaks of LECs, CLECs, and the 19 MRS--

MR. HARRINGTON: He's testifying here and expressing his legal opinion which I'm not sure petitioners agree with.

1 MR. OATES: I'm not making any legal representations. I'm simply quoting the testimony -- I'm sorry -- quoting the language 3 proposed, and I want to ask Mr. Ball what it means. 5 Let me ask you, Mr. Ball, do you have a copy of the Remand Order? 6 7 MR. BALL: Yes. 8 MR. OATES: If you would, look on 9 paragraph 89 on page 44, in a sentence that begins 10 | four lines down, "The rate caps," the sentence I read earlier. 11 12 MR. BALL: Okay. 13 MR. OATES: Is that the mirroring obligation language you referred to? 15 MR. BALL: Yes. 16 MR. OATES: Now, this sentence is talking 17 about incumbent LEC offering to exchange all traffic subject to 251(b)(5) at the same rate, 18 19 period. 20 MR. BALL: Yes. 21 MR. OATES: The WorldCom proposed

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language, like the AT&T proposed language,

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1 says -- and it may not be exactly the same, but it's

2 the same to the extent this question is

3 concerned -- Verizon offers to exchange all traffic

subject to the recip comp provisions of Section

251(b)(5) with LECs, CLECs, and MRS at these

6 information access rates.

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And my question to you is: Is the intent of that language to expand upon the obligation set forth in the Commission's ISP Remand Order in 10 paragraph 89?

> MR. BALL: No.

And is it your understanding MR. OATES: of WorldCom's proposed language -- I'm not asking for a legal opinion, but is it your understanding of 15 WorldCom's proposed language that once Verizon  $16 \parallel \text{offers}$  to exchange 251(b)(5) traffic at the same rates it proposes to exchange ISP-bound traffic with WorldCom, that Verizon satisfies that mirroring obligation, as far as WorldCom is concerned?

> MR. BALL: No.

MR. OATES: All right. And why not? What

else would Verizon have to do?

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MR. BALL: Well, my interpretation of the order is that Verizon must demonstrate that it is offering to exchange traffic with all carriers that it change exchanges 251(b) traffic in a given 6∥state. You cannot do that through letters. have to do that through the traditional process with which Verizon offers to exchange traffic, which is through a filing at a state regulatory commission.

MR. OATES: And where do you find the support in the Act to--I'm sorry, not in the Act. What in the ISP Remand Order supports that 14 | interpretation?

MS. KELLEY: And I want to impose probably a continuing objection. I don't have any problem with Mr. Ball explaining his understanding. 18 Mr. Ball is not a lawyer, however, and the order -- the Commission will interpret the order to mean what the Commission interprets the order to mean. If that's different than Mr. Ball's interpretation or the same as Mr. Ball's

1 interpretation, I don't think it matters. I mean,

2 he's not a lawyer. He could testify to his

3 understanding, but that certainly doesn't bind

4 WorldCom or the Commission or anything like that.

With that objection, I'm happy to have him

6 answer, but I want to make that clear.

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MR. OATES: And I would certainly agree that his testimony doesn't bind the Commission, but my question to him really was to explain this contract language, and that led to an opinion regarding the ISP Remand Order that I would like to explore.

And so, again, the language of the order talks about the ILEC offering traffic--

MR. DYGERT: I think you're welcome to explore it, subject to Ms. Kelley's objection.

MR. OATES: Thank you.

The language of the order, Mr. Ball, as you read, talks about the ILEC offering to exchange traffic, and you suggest that the ILEC needs to do something more than offer; is that right?

MR. BALL: No. I'm saying in order for

1 the ILEC to offer to do that, 251(b) traffic in the 2∥State of Virginia is generally offered by Verizon 3 through a statement of generally available terms, and that was filed at the Virginia Commission and 5 approved by the Virginia Commission.

If Verizon is intending to change its 251(b) rates, it has to make a filing with the Virginia Commission and get it approved.

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So, under WorldCom's proposed MR. OATES: 10 contract language, then, Verizon would not satisfy 11 the mirroring obligations simply by offering to exchange traffic with WorldCom at the appropriate 13 rates?

MR. BALL: Well, I think we are quibbling with what the word "offer" means.

MR. OATES: Fair enough.

Now, with regard to Subsection C, Prerequisite C of Section X.3 of the WorldCom 19∥proposed language, do you agree, Mr. Ball, that any 20∥amounts that may be past due to WorldCom for compensation for ISP-bound traffic is a matter of dispute between Verizon and WorldCom?

MR. BALL: Oh, absolutely.

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MR. OATES: And that dispute is something that arises under the prior Interconnection Agreement; is that right?

> MR. BALL: Yes.

MR. OATES: And that prior Interconnection Agreement has a dispute resolution procedure, does it not?

> MR. BALL: Yes.

MR. OATES: Now, if you would, turn to page 43--actually, we are on page 43 of your 12 testimony. Beginning on line 11, between line 11 and 19, there is a parenthetical comment, I believe, by you on the contract language that appears above; is that right?

> MR. BALL: Yes.

MR. OATES: There is a sentence that begins at the tail end of line 14, says, (reading) The order represents a change in law from that 20 which existed prior to its issuance. And just let me read on: The order established that reciprocal compensation would no longer be payable on

1 ISP-bound traffic. It is clear, therefore, that 2 prior to the entry of the order, the traffic was subject to reciprocal compensation provisions of the Act.

Is that your opinion, Mr. Ball?

MR. BALL: Yes, it is.

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MR. OATES: Can you point me to any place in the Commission's ISP Remand Order where the Commission reaches that conclusion?

> MR. BALL: That there is a change of law?

MR. OATES: That the law that existed prior to the Remand Order mandated payment of 13 reciprocal compensation for ISP-bound traffic.

MR. BALL: I don't believe there is a statement in the order that says that.

MR. OATES: You have a copy of the order, do you not?

> MR. BALL: Yes, I do.

MR. OATES: Let me ask you to look at 20 paragraph one, under the heading "Introduction" in 21 the order. The second sentence says, (reading) We 22 previously found in the declaratory ruling that

1 such traffic, discussing traffic delivered to 2 Internet service providers, that such traffic is 3 subject to interstate traffic subject to the 4 | jurisdiction of the Commission under Section 201 of 5 l the Act, and is not, therefore, subject to the 6 reciprocal compensation provisions of Section

8 Wasn't that the state of the law prior to the remand? 9

MR. BALL: Yes, but I would like to read the next sentence, if you don't mind.

MR. OATES: Go ahead.

7 251(b)(5).

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The Court of Appeals for the MR. BALL: 14 District of Columbia Circuit held on appeal, 15∥however, that the declaratory ruling failed to 16 adequately explain why jurisdictional conclusion was 17 | relevant to the applicability of Section 251(b)(5), 18 and remanded the issue for further consideration.

MR. OATES: Did the Courts of Appeals find that ISP-bound traffic is subject to reciprocal compensation?

> No, but it also did not find MR. BALL:

that ISP traffic was interstate.

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19 FCC order?

2 MR. OATES: They deferred that order to 3 the Commission, did they not?

> MR. BALL: They remanded it.

MR. OATES: Now, going back to your 6 proposed language, Section X.3.2, information access rates, this is the section in which WorldCom proposes the rates that would be used for the exchange of ISP-bound traffic; is that right?

> MR. BALL: Yes.

11 MR. OATES: Those are the rates WorldCom 12 wants in the contract; right?

MR. BALL: These are the rates that we 14 | have been ordered to put in the contract.

15 MR. OATES: Is it your opinion that those 16 rates reflect the FCC order?

> MR. BALL: Yes.

MR. OATES: Reflect the caps set in the

MR. BALL: Yes.

21 MR. OATES: Let me ask you to look at line 22 ll 6 of page 44 of your testimony. It talks about the

rate in place beginning December 14, 2001, ending June 13, 2003. What is that rate?

> MR. BALL: The rate on line nine?

MR. OATES: The rate on line six.

MR. BALL: Okay. It is .001 dollars.

MR. OATES: Paragraph X.4, if you would, flipping over, Mr. Ball, this is WorldCom's 8 proposal regarding the three-to-one--calculation of three-to-one ratio; is that right?

> MR. BALL: Yes.

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MR. OATES: And do you agree, as a question to Mr. Kirchberger, do you agree that traffic that is subject to intrastate or interstate told will be excluded from the traffic considered 15 in this three-to-one calculation?

MR. BALL: Yes.

MR. OATES: Now, do you agree with 18 Mr. Kirchberger's testimony that the FCC Remand Order uses the three-to-one formula to create a 20 rebuttable presumption regarding what traffic is subject to recip comp?

> MR. BALL: Yes.